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with respect to compliance with the Ohio statute. The plaintiff need
only have elected a proper and available remedy by bringing his action
against the bankrupt, reducing his claim to judgment, and filing against
the insurer thereafter. R.M.A.
LABOR LAW
LIMITATION ON DEFINITION OF A TRADE DISPUTE-
PICKETING AS AN EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH
The plaintiff, operator of an exclusive restaurant in the City of
Cleveland, petitioned for an injunction restraining the officers and mem-
bers of three unincorporated labor unions from picketing her place of
business. The defendants were picketing in an attempt to persuade her
to discharge her employees unless they became members of one of the
defendant unions. The plaintiff-employer ran an open shop, did not
attempt to persuade or dissuade her employees from joining any of the
defendant unions, made no inquiry as to union affiliations when hiring
employees, never discharged an employee for union activities, had no
dispute with her employees about the wages or conditions, and did not
undersell restaurants employing union help exclusively. The trial court
rendered a decree restraining all picketing, bannering, and boycotting
of plaintiff's restaurant. On review the Court of Appeals permitted
peaceful picketing and boycotting. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed
the Appellate Court decree and rendered final judgment in conformity
with the Common Pleas Court decree, Judges Zimmerman and Day
dissenting.'
The instant case is the first in which the Supreme Court of Ohio has
been faced with the determination of whether or not the picketing
union's members must be, or have been, employees of the picketed
employer in order for a trade dispute to be in existence. The Courts of
Ohio have for many years held that the right to picket peacefully is
dependent upon the existence of a trade dispute,2 but the question has
continually arisen as to exactly what that term connotes. The majority
in the instant case cite La France Electrical Construction & Supply Co.
v. I.B.E.W.,2' which held a trade dispute to exist when former employees
were seeking to secure the right to work under terms of employment
'Crosby v. Rath 136 Ohio St. 35z, Ohio Bar, March i1, 1940 (1940). The decision
in this case was rendered on the ground that there were no acts of violence.
'La France Co. v. Elec. Workers xo8 Ohio St. 6z, i4o N.E. 899 (19z3)5 Lundoff-
Bicknell Co. v. Smith 24 Ohio App. z94, x56 N.E. 243 (9Z7); Driggs Farms, Inc. v.
Milk Drivers' Union, 49 Ohio App. 303, 3 Ohio Op. 2Z (1935); z O.S.LJ. 302.
a io8 Ohio St. 6x, 14o N.E. 899 (29z3).
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different from those which their employer was requiring. Judge Zim-
merman points out in his dissent that the La France case did not attempt
to define the only instance in which there could be a trade dispute, but
merely held that under such circumstances as those in that case there
was such a dispute. There have been numerous lower court decisions
in Ohio involving this question, the majority of which have been in
accord with the principal case,4 a considerable minority, however, hold-
ing to the contrary.' In the future it is to be expected that the courts
of Ohio will follow the narrow definition of a trade dispute as indicated
by the Supreme Court in the instant case and refuse to recognize the
possibility of its existence unless there is a controversy between the
employer and his employees, the latter of which have an intention and
reasonable expectation that they will return to work for the former.
Twenty-three states' have Anti-Injunction statutes forbidding the
courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes, thirteen of which define a
labor dispute in the words of the Norris-La Guardia Act as "any contro-
versy concerning terms or conditions of employment or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintain-
ing, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the relation of employer-
employee."' Of the 13 states which have this definition, the courts of
most of the jurisdictions have followed the probable intent of the statu-
tory draftsmen and refused to issue an injunction in a labor dispute even
'Saltzman v. Retail Employees', zS Ohio L. Abs. 354, io Ohio Op. 6 (1937)5 Brown
v. United Mine Workers, 25 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 485 (i9zs); United Tailors v. Joint
Board of Amalgamated Workers, z6 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 439 (1926)5 White-Allen Chev-
rolet v. Auto Mech. Union, 27 Ohio L. Abs. Z73, 1z Ohio Op. z88, 3 Lab. Rel. Rep. 205
(193g); Mulholland v. Waiters' Union, 13 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 34z (19oz); Park v. Hotel
Employees, zz Ohio N.P. (N.S.) Z57; Hellman v. Salesmen's Assn., Z3 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 177 (1919); Markowitz v. Retail Dry Cleaners Union, i 9 Ohio L. Abs. 445,
3 Ohio Op. 366 (x935g)5 Driggs Farms v. Milk Drivers' Union, 49 Ohio App. 303 ; 3 Ohio
Op. Z12 (i935). For further discussion see Notes 4 O.S.L.J. iio (1937), 5 O.S.L.J.
236 (1938), and Ohio Bar, March z, 193 8, 703.
'Clark Lunch Co. v. Cleveland Waiters Local, z Ohio App. 265, 154 N.E. 362
(1gz6)5 Wiley v. Retail Clerk'a Assn., 3Z Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 257 (1934); McCormick
v. Local Union, 13 O.C.C. (N.S.) 545, 32 Ohio C.C. 165 (igzx); Frankel Chevrolet v.
Meerchaum, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 4Z5, 1 Ohio Op. 387 (1938).
'States which have Anti-Injunction statutes following the Norris-LaGuardia Act
definition: Colo. Sess. Laws (1933)5 c. 59; Idaho Sess. Laws (1933 C. 215; Ind. Acts
(1933) c. 12i La. Laws (x934) Act. No. 203, p. 6ooi Md. Laws (935) c. 574; Minn.
Stat. (Mason Supp. 1936) sec. 4256 et seq.j N.Y. Laws (1935) c. 477; N.D. Laws (935)
c. 2475 Ore. Code Ann. (Supp. 1935) sec. 49-1901 et seq.i Utah Rev. Stat. (i933) sec.
49.z.6-rz Pa. Laws (I937) No. 308; Wash. Laws Extraord. Sess. (1933) c. 75 ,Vis.
Stats-. (1933) sec. 103.51-103.63. States which have Anti-Injunction statutes but do not
follow the Norris-LaGuardia Act definition: Ariz.5 Calif.; Ill.; Kan.; Mass.; Mont.;
N.H.i N.J.; OkIa.j Wyo. See further The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing, Frank E.
Cooper, 35 M zcu. L. Rev. 73 (1936)5 State Anti-Injunction Legislation, W. P. Riddles-
barger, 14 OR.. L. Rev. Sot (1935)i Statutory Definitions of "Labor Dispute," Orval
Etter, 19 OR. L. REv. 201 (1940).
7 Italics added.
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though none of the plaintiff's employees were members of the defendant-
union. Other courts in this group of states having such statutory defini-
tion have, however, taken a narrower approach, holding that there can
not be a legitimate trade dispute where the picketing parties were not
employees or former employees of the plaintiff-employer.'
In the absence of a statute defining a trade dispute as does the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the majority of courts have rendered decisions
in accord with the Ohio Supreme Court definition.'0 Some few courts
have taken a broader view of the problem and held a trade dispute could
exist where none of the plaintiff-employer's employees were members of
the picketing defendant-union. 1
Judge Day, in his dissent, attacks the majority's holding as a depriva-
tion of defendant's constitutional right of free speech. There is a
decided contrariety of opinion in the courts on the issue of whether or
not an injunction against picketing is a deprivation of the constitutional
guaranty. 2 In Ohio two lower courts have held this no deprivation' 3
,Wilson v. Birl, 27 F. Supp. 915 (1939); Lipoff v. United Food Workers Union,
33 Pa. D. & C. 599 (938)i Peak v. McElroy, 33 Pa. D. & C. 556 (1938); Bergman v.
Levenson, 13 N.Y.S. (2d) 955 (939); Fairfield Bar v. Friedman, 14. N.Y.S. (2d) 709(1939); Bent Steel Sections v. Doe et al., so N.Y.S. (zd) 9zo (939); Wallace v. Inter-
national Assn., '55 Ore. 652, 63 P. (zd) 1090 (1936); Am. Furn. Co. v. 1. B. of T. C.,
z2z Wis. 338, z68 N.W. 250 (1936); Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 222 Wis.
383, z68 N.W. 270 (1936); Lauf v. E. G. Shiner, 303 U.S. 323, S2 L. Ed. 872, S8 Sup.
Ct. 578 (1938).
'Bond Stores v. Turner, 14. N.Y.S. (zd) 705 (939); Fornili v. Auto Mechanic's
Union, zoo Wash. Z83, 93 P. (2d) 422 (1939); Adams v. Bldg. Employees Union, 197
Wash. 242, 84 P. (2d) oz5 (1938); Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Union, 184. Wash.
322, 5S P. (zd) 372 (s935).
"°McKay v. Automobile Salesmen's Union (Cal.) 89 P. (zd) 426 (1939); Duplex
Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 6S L.Ed. 349 (I925); American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189
(s92s); Waitresses' Union v. Benish Restaurant Co. (1925, C.C.A. 8th) 6 F. (2d)
568; Keith Theatre v. Vachon, 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692 (1936); Swing v. A. F. of L.,
372 Ill. 91, 2 N.E. (ad) 857 (939); Motor Truck Co. v. Assn. of Machinists (Ill.
App.), 2z N.E. (2d) 969 (939); Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Drivers' Union, 371 Ill.
377, 21 N.E. (2d) 3o8 (1939); Quinton's Mkt. v. Patterson (Mass.), zi N.E. (zd) 546
(935) Bull v. Alliance of Stage Employees, 119 Kans. 713, 241 Pac. 459 (1925);
Mkt. St. Corp. v. Workers' Local, ss8 N.J. Eq. 448, 179 Atl. 689 (935).
"Blumauer v. Operator's Union, 17 P. (2d) 1115 (1933); Exchange Bakery v.
Rifkin, 254 N.Y. App. Div. 777, 245 N.Y. 26o, 157 N.E. 130 (1927); J. H. & S. Thea-
tres v. Fay, 26o N.Y. 315, 183 N.E. 5o9 (1932)i Empire Theatre v. Cloke, 53 Mont.
183, 163 Pac. 107 (1917)5 Steffes v. Operators Union, 136 Minn. zoo, 161 N.,V. 524.
(1917); United Theatres v. Operators Union, 5o F. (2d) 189 (1931).
" It is interesting to note that the courts seldom, if ever, distinguish between ban-
nering, boycotting and picketing, as an exercise of free speech. The writer has failed to
find any court drawing a distinction between these three when discussing the constitutional
guaranty. This appears to be an expansive approach of the courts since picketing and ban-
nering do not necessarily involve speech as it is usually defined, no actual utterance being
present. However, this would appear to be a correct interpretation by the courts, since
speech, besides the oral, involves the elements of expression and communication. There
may be more of an expression and communication by a group of men walking back and
forth in front of a store than there would be in the same men standing in front of the
store and orally attempting to dissuade customers from entering the store.
"Hellman v. Salesmen's Assn., 23 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 177 (1919); Foundry Co. v.
Molders' Union, 2o Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 16 (917).
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and one has discussed the issue but based its judgment on other
grounds.' 4 Several courts in other states have recognized the right to
picket as an exercise of the constitutional guaranty of free speech, " one
even going so far as to hold that the right to picket is unlimited and
should be applied to any and all disputes between a business man and
groups of citizens who may differ with him on a question of policy. 6
On the other hand, there have been about an equal number of courts
holding that issuing an injunction against picketing is not a deprivation
of free speech.1" The Ohio Supreme Court in quoting from the syllabus
in 31Ieadowmoor Dairies v. Drvers' Union,' a recent Illinois case, suc-
cinctly states the usual line of thought of those courts that hold that
there has been no deprivation. That syllabus reads "the right to con-
tract, the right to do business and the right to labor freely and without
restraint are all constitutional rights equally sacred, and the privilege of
free speech cannot be used to the exclusion of other constitutional rights
nor as an excuse for unlawful activities in interference with another's
business, as the right to acquire and protect property is an inherent right
not given but declared by the constitution." It appears that the courts
first decide if an injunction will issue; if it will, then they state that
freedom of speech is a consitutional right which must be exercised so as
not to interfere with other constitutional property rights. The Ohio case
of Hellman v. Salesmen's iss'n." is an example of this reasoning. The
court there discussed the two conflicting rights, one of property and one
of personal liberty, and stated that there must be an attempt to harmonize
the two in every case. From that point on the court stresses the infringe-
ment upon the employer's property rights by the unlawful interference
by the defendant-union, that "unlawfulness" merely consisting of ban-
nering of plaintiff's place of business as "unfair." The defeudant-union,
then, has no opportunity to stand on its constitutional guaranty, because,
before that issue is discussed, the bannering and picketing is said to be
unlawful solely because it infringes on plaintiff's constitutional property
guarantees. If the courts were to reverse their order of discussion and
"' Brown Mfg. Co. v. Local Union, iz Ohio Dec. N.P. 753 (x9oz).
'SIn re Heffron 179 Mo..App. 639 (1913); Lindsay & Co. v. Mont. Fed. of Labor,
37 Mont. 264, iS L.R.A. (N.S.) 707 (igoS)i Ex Parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 293,
81 P. (zd) 190 (1938)05 Senn. v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 81 L. Ed.
1229, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (1937); People v. Harris, 104 Colo. 386, 91 P. (zd) 989 ('939).
IS Ex Partc Lyons, note z6, supra.
' Cooks & Waiters Union v. Papageorge (Tex. Civ. App.), 230 S.V. so86 (zgzi);
Jordahl v. Hayda, i Cal. App. 696, 8z P. 1079 (19o); Meadow-moor Dairies v. Drivers'
Union, Note io, sutra; Swing v. A. F. of L., note o, sopra; Am. Fed. of Labor v.
Buck's Stove & R. Co., 33 App. D.C. 83 (x9o9)5 Robison v. Hotel Employees, 35 Idaho
418, 207 Pac. 13Z (x92z).
2s Note xo, supra.
1 Note 13, supra.
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hold that the defendant's bannering and picketing is in accord with its
constitutional right, then perforce these courts would have to hold that
the issuance of an injunction against such bannering would be unlawful.
The ultimate decision would rest on which constitutional guaranty is
emphasized first. The effort of those courts using this line of reasoning
is in accord with the early tendency of the courts of this country to
uphold property rights where in conflict with personal liberties, but it is
doubtful if it is in accord with the more modern trend protecting civil
liberties."0
Some further light on the constitutional issue raised by Judge Day
is afforded by the United States Supreme Court's recent opinions in
the two cases involving anti-picketing statutes, Thornhill v. A4labama,2
and Carlson v. California." Although these decisions of the high court
of the country concerned the validity of flat proscriptions of picketing
by legislative fiat as distinguished from the judicial order restraining
picketing approved by the Ohio Supreme Court in the instant case, both
type-situations find a common denominator in the new constitutional
doctrine that no state can, consistently with the supreme law of the
land, deprive any person of the liberty of free speech. In the Thornhill
opinion Mr. Justice Murphy includes Dorchy v. Kansas2" in his footnote
support for the proposition "that the rights of employers and employees
to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others for a share
in the products of industry are subject to modification or qualification
in the interests of the society in which they exist." The Dorchy case
found Mr. Justice Brandeis, for the Court, sustaining a Kansas statute
restricting the use of the strike weapon, in its application to a union effort
to enforce a stale and questionable claim. Quite recently, in a per
curiam opinion not referred to by the Court's newest member, the Court
dismissed an appeal from a Maine decision24 which had not found invalid
a state statute for criminal conspiracy in its application to non-employee
union officials conducting a strike for a dosed shop.2" It would appear,
then, that there remains to the state a power "to set the limits of per-
missible contest open to industrial combatants."2 What those limits
are, in the light of present-day emphasis upon civil liberty guaranties,
only the interstitial process of case-by-case litigation can tell. There is
' Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U.S. 496, 83 L. Ed. 14Z3, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939); Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 8z L. Ed. 949, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (x938); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. x4.7, 5 Lab. Rel. Rep. 33z (1939).
"-U.S.-, 84 L. Ed. 659, 6o Sup. Ct. 736 (1940).
"-U.S. -, 84 L. Ed. 668, 6o Sup. Ct. 746 (1940).
"272 U.S. 306, 71 L. Ed. 248, 47 Sup. Ct. 86 (I926).
'State v. Mackesy, 135 Me. 488, zoo Atl. 51I (1938).
" Mackesy v. State, 305 U.S. 570, 83 L. Ed. 359, 59 Sup. Ct. 230 (1938).
'Justice Murphy in Thornhill v. Alabama, Note 21, supra.
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some basis in the Thornhill opinion for believing that the Federal
Supreme Court views non-violent picketing as impregnable from gov-
ernmental attack, whatever the circumstances of its use. Mr. Justice
IM'Iurphy's statement that "in the circumstances of our times the dissem-
ination of information concerning the facts of a labor union dispute
must be regarded as within that area of free discussion guaranteed by
the Constitution" is indicative of such an approach. Yet the opinion is
also susceptible of the interpretation that the Court was bent only upon
striking down statutes so all-inclusive as to deny to labor the picketing
weapon in any and all circumstances. "The statute as thus authorita-
tively construed and applied leaves room for no exceptions based upon
either the number of persons engaged in the proscribed activity, the
peaceful character of their demeanor, the nature of their dispute with
an employer, or the restrained character and the accurateness of the
terminology used in notifying the public of the facts of the dispute ...
We think that Section 3448 is invalid on its face." Although in neither
of the Federal Court cases were the full facts regarding the matters
which resulted in the picketing before the Court, it is evident that in
those cases there was an actual strike between employers and employees
in furtherance of which the latter were picketing, whereas in the Ohio
high court case the picketing was carried on by non-employees in the
absence of any strike solely to induce the employer to employ only union
members. The United States Supreme Court in the Thornhill case
continually refers to the importance of free speech in the proper dissem-
ination of the facts of a "labor dispute." Justice Brandeis, assuming the
existence of a labor dispute, had previously stated in Senn v. Tile Layers
Protective Union2 that "members of a union might, without special
statutory authorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor
dispute for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution." In
view of this it does not seem unlikely that the constitutional issue in the
area here under consideration will, like the equity issue earlier discussed,
be resolved in terms of the meaning to be given that significant phrase.
H.M.M.
' Note xg, supra.
